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An Analysis of Spatial Interactions Among Countries’  











Countries’ capital account policies might be contagious in the sense 
that domestic policies are driven by other countries’ policies. A 
model of strategic interactions is developed to show that countries’ 
best response to policy changes elsewhere consists in imitating this 
policy.  
Using a spatial econometric model, the hypothesis of policy 
interactions is tested in a large panel data set. The evidence shows 
that capital account policies are contemporaneously correlated across 
countries. Concerning fundamentals, the move to a fixed exchange 
rate regime and an increase in real world interest rates are correlated 
with the imposition of capital account restrictions. 
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1  Introduction 
 
Whether capital may move freely in and out of a country, is a policy decision taken by 
national governments and central banks. While capital flows may contribute to an efficient 
allocation of capital both in geographic and intertemporal terms, their volatility and 
speculative nature have aroused concern: The positive temporary growth effects of capital 
account liberalization as predicted by the neoclassical growth theory might be offset by the 
negative effects of recurrent financial instability and crises. Countries’ capital account 
policies have to take these potential costs and benefits into account. 
 
This paper reconsiders the determinants of capital account policy. It adds two novel aspects to 
the extensive literature on the causes and consequences of capital account liberalization: First, 
it analyses the determinants of policy changes as opposed to policy reversals and, second, 
focuses on policy interactions among countries. 
 
While other studies have investigated the determinants of capital account liberalization
1 or of 
cross-country differences in financial openness, this paper explicitly considers policy changes. 
The existing literature examines large and permanent changes in capital account policy, 
namely policy reforms like liberalization episodes. My approach, however, analyses capital 
account policy in a more general context in that it also includes policy changes that are small 
or temporary. After many countries have liberalised their capital accounts, there is room for 
policy adjustments: Capital account policy, like the temporary re-imposition of controls, can 
be used strategically and hence has become an instrument of international economic policy. 
This paper treats capital account policy as an alterable policy instrument and tries to identify 
the factors that drive this policy. 
 
The existing literature focuses on economic and political characteristics of a country as 
potential determinants of its capital account policy. While concentrating on country 
fundamentals, this approach disregards one possibly important factor: policy spillovers across 
countries.  
                                                 
1 Capital account liberalization refers to a discrete policy change from a regime of a closed capital account to one 
that favours financial integration in the world market. It is usually measured by a binary variable. The analysis of 
capital account liberalization disregards policy adjustments as long as they do not represent a fundamental policy 
change.   3
Capital account policies might be contagious in the sense that countries copy their 
neighbours’ policies. In the literature on financial crises, contagion is defined as a significant 
increase in the probability of a crisis conditional on a crisis occurring in another country. 
Analogously, policies might be driven rather by policy changes in other countries than by 
domestic fundamentals. In this case, the series of an index of capital account openness would 
show a significant degree of co-movement across countries, which cannot be explained by 
fundamental determinants of capital account policy.  
 
The analysis of macroeconomic policy interactions among countries has a long tradition. 
Whereas the traditional focus is on interactions of countries’ monetary, fiscal and trade 
policies, countries’ capital account policies might also be characterised by international 
linkages. In the case of trade policy, a country’s openness is influenced by the policies of 
trading partners. Since changes in tariffs and barriers to trade are usually the result of bi- or 
multinational negations – even institutionalised by the WTO – a country’s policy is driven by 
the general tendency: A country might only agree to liberalise its barriers to trade if its trading 
partners also do so. Hence, in trade policy the co-movement of policies is a result of the 
bargaining process. In the case of capital account openness, this co-movement of policies 
might also be present although for different reasons. Nonetheless, existing empirical studies 
generally assume that the capital account policy is driven by domestic factors.  
 
To my knowledge there are only two papers that include the notion of policy interactions in 
their analysis of capital account policies. Leblang (1997) augments the set of domestic 
determinants of capital controls by a systemic variable that is exogenous to the domestic 
economy. He assumes that the increasing de facto financial integration raises the cost of 
capital controls and therefore increases the incentive to liberalize the capital account.
2 The 
empirical results do not support his hypothesis: Whereas the relationship between de facto and 
de jure financial openness is insignificant for OECD countries, they are negatively correlated 
(contrary to the hypothesis) in non-OECD countries. Simmons and Elkins (2004) investigate 
interdependent state behaviour in discrete shifts between policy regimes. They conclude that 
capital account liberalization, the decision to move from a closed to an open capital account, 
is influenced by international economic competition. Models that only consider domestic 
determinants of policy are misspecified.  
                                                 
2 He disregards the fact that de facto financial integration is affected by capital account policy. De facto financial 
integration is neither systemic nor exogenous to a given country.     4
Gassebner et al. (2010) use a similar econometric approach to investigate whether economic 
reforms in one country are influenced by reforms adopted by other countries. They find 
evidence for the importance of reforms in geographically and culturally proximate countries. 
 
Since the following analysis focuses on the policies that determine the openness of the capital 
account, it restricts its attention to de jure capital account openness. De facto capital account 
openness, which may be measured by the flows or stocks of cross-border capital, is a different 
concept. De facto capital account openness is expected to depend on the de jure openness to 
the degree that controls are effective and difficult to evade. Aizenman and Noy (2009) find 
weak evidence that de jure restrictions on capital flows reduce de facto financial openness. 
Dooley (1996) concludes that controls have been effective in sustaining yield differentials 
between domestic and foreign investments.  
 
This paper is organised as follows: Section 2 describes possible interactions among countries’ 
capital account policies. To motivate the empirical work, section 3 develops a game-theoretic 
model of countries’ best response to capital account policies in other countries. Section 4 




2  Contagious capital account policy 
 
Capital account policy is usually regarded as being driven by domestic factors, economic and 
political ones. However, there are several reasons why domestic capital account policy might 
be affected by neighbouring countries’ policies. The interaction among countries might have 
three different causes: economic competition, signalling externalities and information 
diffusion.  
 
Economic competition: If a country dismantles capital controls, it reduces the cost imposed on 
foreigners who invest domestically. Their net-of-tax return rises. As a result the country 
attracts capital inflows whose counterpart are capital outflows in other countries, which have 
become less attractive investment places due to the other country’s policy. Capital outflows 
will especially be notable in countries of the same geographic region since empirical studies 
have shown that international investors allocate capital to regions rather than specific 
countries. As a result, a neighbouring country that wants to prevent capital outflows has to 
copy its neighbour’s policy and liberalise its capital account as well.    5
If a country raises capital controls, this reduces foreign investors’ net return and leads to a 
reallocation of capital to other countries. Hence, countries benefit from the imposition of 
controls elsewhere.  
 
Signalling externalities: The use of capital controls might also produce negative externalities: 
Their imposition might be interpreted as a signal of worsening fundamentals. The country 
fears a speculative attack and therefore impedes capital outflows. Neighbouring countries 
might be affected by this policy by various channels: First, investors might again consider the 
region as a sum and assume that fundamentals in the neighbouring countries have worsened, 
too. Therefore, they withdraw their capital from countries of the same region. Second, even if 
fundamentals are independent between countries, investors might fear that a currency crisis in 
the centre country spreads to neighbouring countries due to contagion. As a result, they will 
also withdraw their capital. Third, investors might fear that the country fears that investors 
withdraw their capital because of the two points made before. Therefore, investors expect the 
country to impose capital controls. In consequence, investors try to withdraw their capital 
before the country prohibits capital repatriation. All three points indicate that the imposition 
of capital controls in one country induces capital outflows in the other country. The country 
may prevent this capital outflow by a simultaneous imposition of capital controls. Hence, 
investors’ expectations regarding capital account policy might become self-fulfilling. This 
strain of argumentation shows that contagious crises might lead to contagion in policies.  
 
Information diffusion: The use of a certain capital account policy – i.e. the introduction of 
capital outflow controls – provides information of its effects and potential benefits for other 
countries (demonstration effect). Countries learn from a successful policy implementation 
elsewhere. A positive experience with a policy leads to a re-examination of this policy tool in 
other countries. 
If other countries recently changed their capital account policy, a government can more easily 
justify an equal adjustment of its policy and enforce this policy against the pressures of 
interest groups. When neighbours relax capital controls it becomes harder to justify them 
politically and economically. 
 
All these arguments point to the fact that capital account policies cannot be considered 
independently of other countries’ policies. Besides domestic factors, there is a role for   6
international interdependencies. As described above, interdependencies might be the result of 
economic competition, signalling effects and information diffusion. 
 
Resource flow model 
This strategic interaction among countries can be modelled in the framework of a resource 
flow model (see Brueckner 2003). In this model, a country is affected by the amount of a 
resource that is employed within its borders. While the global level of this resource is given, 
its distribution between different countries depends on the policy choices of all countries. 
Hence, a country chooses the level of a decision variable zi but it is also indirectly affected by 
the decisions in other countries, z-i.  
This model has been applied to international corporate tax competition, both theoretically and 
empirically (see Brueckner and Saavedra 2001 and Devereux et al. 2008).
3 Since capital 
controls decrease the expected return of foreigners’ domestic investment, they can be 
considered as an indirect form of taxation.
4 Consequently, the model can directly be applied 
to countries’ choices with regard to their capital account policy. 
 
Assume that country i’s objective function V
~
is given by: 
 
() i i i X s z V , ,
~
                   ( 1 )  
 
where si is the level of domestic assets held by foreigners and Xi is a vector of characteristics 
of country i, on which preferences depend. The level of foreign investment depends on the 
capital account policy at home (zi) and in all other countries (z-i) as well as on characteristics 
of the domestic economy: 
 
() i i i i X z z H s , , − =                   ( 2 )  
 
                                                 
3 This literature usually finds evidence for interactions among different countries’ tax rates, although a race to 
the bottom cannot be confirmed. The strength of these interactions depends positively on a country’s degree of 
financial openness. Devereux et al. (2008) find evidence that capital account liberalization in OECD countries 
has increased strategic interactions in taxsetting. The removal of capital controls is associated with a decrease of 
domestic corporate tax rates. 
4 Capital controls are basically a form of taxation. They differ from conventional taxes since they are only levied 
on cross-border investment, namely domestic investment of foreigners or the investment of domestic citizens 
abroad. 
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Xi contains economic variables like corporate tax rates and the domestic return on capital as 
well as institutional variables like political stability and corruption. After substituting (2) into 
(1), the reduced form of the model can be written as: 
 
() i i i X z z V , , −                    ( 3 )  
 
This objective function is maximised by choice of zi resulting in a reaction function of the 
form 
 
() i i i X z R z , − =                   ( 4 )  
 
Hence, the capital account policy of country i depends on its characteristics Xi and on the 
capital account policy in the rest of the world. In this general form, the slope of the reaction 
function can take either sign. 
What are the consequences of changes in other countries’ capital account policies? Let us 
assume that in the status quo world capital is distributed across countries such that its net 
return is equalised. Moreover, zi has been chosen such that country i’s objective function is 
maximised.  
There are two channels through which the choice of zi affects domestic welfare: First, the 
capital account policy determines the amount of foreign capital within the domestic economy. 
A unilateral removal of capital controls leads to a higher level of capital per worker. This 
increases labour productivity and consequently labour income. The growth rate of output 
increases temporarily. Capital account restrictions, in turn, decrease the return on domestic 
capital and render investment projects inefficient that would be profitable without capital 
account restrictions.
5 The relationship between capital account policy and the allocation of 
world capital is formally illustrated in Appendix A. Second, capital account restrictions 
increase a country’s monetary policy autonomy under fixed and managed exchange rates. 
They may reduce exchange rate volatility and reduce the risk of sudden capital flight, which 
might result in a currency crisis. Currency crises, in turn, usually reduce the growth rate of 
output.  
In sum, there is a trade-off between output growth and the reduction of output volatility. 
Countries that maximise their utility choose an optimal combination of the level of output and 
output stability.  
 
                                                 
5 It is assumed that the imposition of capital controls raises domestic interest rates. That is to say, the loss of 
capital inflows is not totally substituted by an increase in domestic savings.   8
It is worth noting that the net return of capital invested abroad depends on the entire vector of 
z: If one country imposes capital controls, the net return of capital falls in all countries. 
Hence, investment projects that so far have not been profitable in countries j≠i, become 
attractive for foreign capital. Capital leaves the country that raised controls and is redirected 
to the remaining countries. Labour productivity increases in these countries. As a 
consequence, raising capital controls has a positive externality for the rest of the world.  
 
Are these theoretical considerations with respect to the influence of capital account openness 
on interest rates and the level of output supported by empirical findings? Henry (2003) reports 
empirical evidence that capital account liberalization increases output through its effect on the 
domestic interest rate: Capital account liberalization permanently decreases the cost of capital 
and raises investment. This temporarily increases the growth rate of output such that the level 
of output is permanently higher. This finding is confirmed by Bekaert et al. (2005) who find 
that the growth rate of GDP per capita increases after capital account liberalizations. 
With respect to the relationship between capital account openness and the likelihood of 
growth-reducing currency crises the findings are ambiguous. While some studies claim that 
controls increase the risk of currency crises (Bordo et al. 2001; Leblang 2003; Glick and 
Hutchison 2005), others find financial liberalization to be positively associated with the 
occurrence of currency crises (Kaminsky and Reinhart 1999; Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache 
1998). The latter emphasise an indirect transmission channel: Financial liberalization 
increases the probability of banking crises, which, in turn, are positively correlated with 
currency crises (twin crises). 
 
The process of global capital account liberalization has seen two waves, first in industrial 
countries (late 1970s and early 1980s) and later in developing countries (late 1980s and early 
1990s). Is this observation consistent with the concept of contagious policies? Our theory 
explains both, the observation of a general trend and the difference in timing for the two 
country groups. Countries compete for capital with members of their peer group, namely 
countries with similar characteristics with respect to country risk, financial development and 
the level of income. Policy interactions primarily take place between countries that are 
considered similar with respect to investment conditions. As a consequence, the trend, which 
may be explained by the strategic interactions among countries, is expected to be limited to 
countries of a peer group. Policy changes in different country groups are rather independent of 
each other and may occur at different points in time.   9
3  A game-theoretic model of strategic interactions: growth versus crises 
 
Given these theoretical considerations with respect to policy spillovers across countries, I 
present a simple model of these strategic interactions. It is assumed that there exist two groups 
of countries: In the first group capital is relatively abundant and in the other capital is 
relatively scarce. Since the marginal productivity of capital is relatively high in the latter 
group, capital flows to these countries.  
The strategic interactions affect the group of recipient countries. They compete for the capital 
of the capital-abundant region. The model examines the interaction between two countries of 
the inflow group, a domestic country and a foreign country. They can influence the amount of 
capital inflows by their capital account policy. Foreign variables are denoted by an asterisk. 
All equations are stated from the perspective of the domestic country. Since countries are 
assumed to be symmetric, one gets the corresponding equation for the foreign country by 
putting an asterisk on domestic variables and vice versa.  
Assume that governments face the following loss function: 
 
()
2 * y y L − =                    ( 5 )  
 
where y represents output and 
* y  its target value. 
* y  may be considered as the maximum 
value of output that is attained if all other potential recipients of capital flows have closed 
capital accounts. As a consequence, the entire capital flow from the capital-abundant region is 
invested in the country under consideration. This implies that 
* y y ≤ . 
* y corresponds to the 
state without currency crisis. If all other potential recipients of capital flows are closed, a 
sudden capital flight is less probable since a reallocation of capital to other countries is not 
possible. Since I want to focus on the effect of capital account policy, all other determinants 
of output are assumed to be pre-determined. 
 
Output is affected by capital account openness through two channels, a direct and an indirect 
one: First, more open economies are expected to attract more capital, which increases output. 
Analogically, the more open the foreign country, the more international capital it withdraws 
from the domestic economy:  
 
1 3 2 1 x z z y ρ ρ ρ + + =
∗                  ( 6 )  
 
where our policy variable z is an index of capital account openness with larger values 
indicating a higher degree of openness. x1 are country characteristics that affect output. The   10
ρ’s are coefficients, which are assumed to be pre-determined. If capital account openness 
increases growth, ρ1>0. If the foreign country opens its capital account, the world net capital 
return rises and capital leaves the domestic country  (ρ2<0). The other determinants x1 are 
defined such that larger values increase growth (ρ3>0).  
The second channel, through which capital account openness affects growth, is an indirect 
one: Financial openness is expected to be positively associated with the probability of a 
currency crisis, which, in turn, affects economic growth: 
 
2 4 3 2 1 x z z z δ δ δ δ θ + Δ + Δ + =
∗                 ( 7 )  
 
where θ denotes the probability of a currency crisis with  1 0 ≤ ≤θ . Financially more open 
economies are more likely to suffer from a crisis (δ1>0). Moreover, changes in capital account 
policy (Δz) may be regarded as a signal that induces investors to re-examine their investment 
choices. If a decrease in capital account openness is interpreted as a signal for an ensuing 
crisis,  δ2 is negative. Accordingly, if the foreign country decreases its capital account 
openness, investors might fear that the whole region will be affected by a contagious crisis 
(δ3<0)
6. x2 is a vector of other factors that determine the probability of a currency crisis. These 
variables are assumed to be independent of the policy choice z.  
After combining (6) and (7) and assuming that the output cost of a financial crisis is C
7, 
expected output is determined by the following expression: 
 
C x z z y ⋅ + + + =
∗ θ ρ ρ ρ 1 3 2 1                ( 8 )  
 
We now derive the reaction function for the domestic country. Substituting the constraint (8) 
in the loss function (5) and minimizing the loss function with respect to the country’s policy 
choice z, yields the following reaction function: 
 
() ( ) ( ) ()
*
2 4 1 3 1 2 1 3 2
2 1 1
1
y C x z z z x z
C







∗ δ δ δ ρ ρ
δ δ ρ
      (9) 
                                                 
6 It is assumed that the level of capital account openness in the foreign country is uncorrelated with the 
probability of a crisis in the domestic country. 
7 While a fully-fledged financial crisis is assumed to depress output directly, the probability of a crisis and the 
level of output are negatively associated through the foreign investment channel: Foreign investors require a rate 
of return that equals the world interest rate plus a country-specific risk premium. The risk premium increases in 
the probability of a crisis. This implies that risky countries have to pay a higher rate of return, which, in turn, 
means that the number of profitable investment projects decreases in the risk premium.   11
where  1 − z  and 
*
1 − z  represent the level of capital account openness in the preceding time period 
in the domestic and foreign country, respectively. To simplify this expression, a term D is 















             ( 9 ’ )  
 
The second order condition for a minimum of the loss function implies that 
() C ⋅ + − > 2 1 1 δ δ ρ  which means that the overall effect of financial openness on growth is 
positive, since the direct output effect dominates the output-reducing effect of crises. This 
assumption is in line with empirical findings (Rancière et al. 2006). 
 
The reaction function illustrates how the capital account policy of the domestic country 
depends on the foreign country’s policy. Given our assumptions concerning the signs of the 
coefficients, the policies are positively related: If one country liberalises its capital account, 
the other country’s best response is to follow this policy and to remove controls as well. If one 
country raises capital controls, the other country’s best response is to imitate this policy. 
These reaction functions are depicted in Figure 1. Their intersection is the non-cooperative 
Nash solution. 
 
 [Insert Figure 1 about here] 
 
Assume that the reaction function of the foreign country changes such that for each policy z a 
larger value z* is chosen. This might be induced by a change in other determinants of output 
(x1*) that decreases output. As a consequence, D increases and the reaction function moves 
upward (see reaction function z*’(z) in Figure 1). The new Nash equilibrium is characterised 
by both, a higher value of z and a higher value of z*. This illustrates the case of policy 
contagion: If a change in fundamentals induces one country to open its capital account, the 
other country’s best response consists in copying this policy even though domestic conditions 
have not changed. 
 
 
   12
4   Empirical strategy  
 
The following section sets the foundations for the empirical analysis: It describes the data set, 
presents the standard control variables and explains the econometric approach 
 
4.1  Data 
 
The empirical analysis is carried out on the basis of a pooled data set of cross-country and 
time-series observations. It contains annual data from 1970 to 2007 for 160 countries. Since 
data for several explanatory variables are missing for some countries, the number of countries 
used in the econometric analysis depends on the particular specification and is indicated in the 
respective tables. With a few exceptions data are taken from the International Financial 
Statistics of the IMF and the World Development Indicators of the World Bank. A detailed 
description of the sample and data sources can be found in the appendices B and C. 
 
4.2 Measures of capital account policy 
 
Capital account openness may be limited by legal restrictions. These include direct controls 
on capital inflows and capital outflows, quantitative limits and prohibitions. Multiple 
exchange rate systems and the taxation of capital flows are forms of indirect capital controls. 
 
Most indices of de jure capital account openness are based on the information provided in the 
IMF’s Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions (AREAER). It 




An index of capital account openness that is based on this information was developed by 
Chinn and Ito (2002, 2006). It embodies four binary dummy variables on restrictions on 
international financial transactions, namely the presence of multiple exchange rates, 
restrictions on current account transactions, restrictions on capital account transactions and 
the requirement of the surrender of export proceeds. The index value is given by the first 
                                                 
8 The data set also has some shortcomings. It neither provides information about the intensity of controls – are 
limits binding? – nor about their effectiveness and enforcement. Moreover, these variables are too aggregated. 
For example, they do not distinguish between controls on capital inflows and controls on capital outflows. 
   13
principal component of these four dummy variables. Higher values indicate that countries are 
more open to cross-border financial transactions.  
 
An alternative index of de jure capital account openness is provided by Edwards (2007). He 
combines the information of the indices of Quinn (2003) and Mody and Murshid (2005), 
which are based on data from the IMF. Country-specific information is used to revise and 
refine the index. The index is scaled over the range from zero to one hundred where a score of 
one hundred is equivalent to free capital mobility. Since the index provides data only until the 
year 2000, regressions including the index cover a reduced period ending in 2000.  
 
4.3  Control variables 
 
In the following section the control variables are presented. The selection of these potential 
determinants of capital account policy is guided by previous empirical studies in this area 
(e.g. Leblang 1997; Brune et al. 2001; Glick and Hutchison 2005).  
 
Development: The literature on the timing of capital account liberalization emphasises that a 
developed banking system, prudential regulation and sound institutions are prerequisites for 
countries being able to benefit from large capital flows (see for example McKinnon (1993) 
and Edwards (1984)). These institutional conditions generally depend on the level of 
development of a country, for which GDP per capita is a proxy. It is therefore expected that 
countries with a higher GDP per capita are associated with a more open capital account. 
Trade openness: Trade openness and capital account openness are expected to affect each 
other positively for various reasons. First, ideological beliefs might foster the integration of a 
country in the world economy with respect to both flows of goods and flows of capital. 
Second, countries that are open to trade are characterised by temporary deficits and surpluses 
in their current account. Capital flows are required to finance this imbalance in trade flows. 
Finally, the benefits of an open capital account fall disproportionately on those engaged in 
international trade. Hence, countries with a relatively large sector for tradables possess a 
stronger interest group in favour of capital account liberalization.   
Government size: The relative size of government might affect a government’s position 
towards financial openness. The larger government expenditures are, the stronger the 
incentive to restrict capital flows in order to secure sufficient government revenues. Various 
authors point out that rent-seeking activities, which might increase in the relative size of the 
government, explain the resistance to opening the economy (Alesina et al. 1994; Leblang   14
1997). In the empirical analysis relative government size is measured by government 
consumption relative to GDP.  
Trade imbalance: The balance of the current account relative to GDP is an additional factor 
that influences capital account policy. Large current account deficits imply that the country 
accumulates external debt. Capital controls might be used to limit these deficits. 
Exchange rate regime: According to the policy trilemma, the objectives of exchange rate 
stability, monetary policy independence and capital mobility are mutually inconsistent. Only 
two out of these three possible objectives can be attained jointly. Capital controls are a means 
of resolving the trilemma: By restricting capital mobility, they allow a country to pursue an 
independent monetary policy under a fixed exchange rate system. If the domestic currency 
comes under pressure, the exchange rate peg may be defended by restrictions on cross-border 
capital flows, which limit the scope for speculation. Therefore, countries with fixed exchange 
rate regimes are less likely to remove capital controls. 
 
Besides these macroeconomic variables, political factors might also determine a country’s 
capital account policy.  
Type of rule: Democracies are more likely to open their capital account: Autocracies tend to 
maximize their power over the domestic economy by insulating it from external market 
forces. Democracies are generally characterised by fewer restrictions. 
Freedom: Countries that are characterised by a high degree of political and economic freedom 
are more likely to allow the free movement of capital. 
 
World interest rate: Low real interest rates in the rest of the world imply that the incentives to 
invest abroad are weak, whereas capital inflows might be larger. In such an environment, 
capital outflow controls might be removed without much effect. On the other hand, the 
control of capital inflows gains in importance. Hence, the overall effect on capital account 
openness is ambiguous. 
    
Pressures on the foreign exchange market (currency crises): The causality between currency 
crises and capital controls may run in both directions: On the one hand, the presence of capital 
controls might influence the probability of a currency crisis. On the other, pressures on the 
foreign exchange market or the experience of a crisis might affect a country’s capital account 
policy.    15
Whereas actual currency crises are characterized by sharp depreciations, an unsuccessful 
speculative attack can be identified indirectly by counteractive measures taken by a central 
bank: The currency may be defended by the sale of reserves or an increase of the interest rate. 
Following the strategy of Eichengreen et al. (1996) an index of exchange market pressures 
(EMPI) is calculated: It summarizes the changes of the nominal exchange rate and reserves, 





















where e is the nominal exchange rate and R are reserves. t indicates the time period and the 
index i denotes a certain country. The standard deviation σ is calculated individually for each 
country over the whole period. In our application changes in e are calculated relative to the 
U.S. Changes in reserves are not compared with a reference country since a simultaneous fall 
of reserves in many countries might signal a global crisis. 
A currency crisis is usually defined to occur if the index exceeds its mean plus two standard 
deviations. Instead of using a binary variable, the continuous index is used in the regression 
analysis. This has two advantages: First, any threshold value of the index that separates crisis 
from non-crisis episodes would be arbitrary. Second, the index allows us to investigate 




The validity of the following empirical analysis relies on the assumption that the time-series 
are stationary. To check the stationarity of our variables, two panel unit root tests are applied 
that account for cross-sectional dependence: Pesaran (2007) and Breitung (2000). The results 
are reported in Table 1. The hypothesis of non-stationary series cannot be rejected for some of 
our variables in levels at conventional levels of significance. However, the results do not point 
to a unit root in any of the first-differenced series. 
 
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
                                                 
9 In contrast to Eichengreen et al. (1996) this index does not include changes in the interest rate. This approach, 
which is in line with other empirical studies, is due to missing interest rate data for many countries.   16
4.5 Econometric methodology 
 
As described in the theoretical section, the policy of one country might be influenced by 
policy decisions in other countries. A country’s capital account policy might be driven by the 
international tendency rather than domestic fundamentals. There might exist a contagion 
effect that leads to co-movements in capital account policy changes. 
 
Hence, besides the set of control variables (see section 4.3) other countries’ capital account 






jt ij it CAP w P A C  and  1 = ∑
≠i j
ij w  
 
where CAP is an index of capital account openness and the subscript t stands for time. wij are 
nonnegative weights, which are specified a priori. These weights measure the importance of 
country j’s capital account policy for country i.  
As weighting scheme I use the classical spatial weighting matrix, which has been used widely 
for analyzing bilateral trade flows. It is based on the geographic distance between countries. 
More proximate countries obtain a larger weight. Hence, I assume that the influence of other 
countries’ policies is inversely related to distance: The closer a country, the stronger its policy 
correlation.  
These weights are calculated as follows: For each country, the maximal bilateral distance is 
determined. From this value, the individual distances are subtracted such that the most 
proximate country receives the highest value and the most distant country the value zero. To 
obtain weights, these values are normalised such that they sum to one for each country.     
 
The following panel equation is estimated: 
 
it i t i
i j
jt ij it u c X CAP w CAP + + + = −
≠ ∑ β α 1 ,  
 
where α and β are coefficients (β is a vector). X is the matrix of control variables. ci is a 
country-specific fixed effect and uit the error term. Although α is assumed to be constant   17
across countries, the strength of the interaction effect differs between countries depending on 
the weights with  ij j i w z z ⋅ = ∂ ∂ α .
10 
 
Since we are interested in explaining changes in current account policies, the equation is 
estimated in first differences. Moreover, all control variables X are lagged by one period to 
limit simultaneity problems. 
 
In estimating interaction models, two issues warrant special attention: (1) the endogeneity of 
the other countries’ policy choices zj and (2) the possible correlation of the error term across 
countries (spatial dependence).  
Strategic interaction implies that the policy choices in different countries are determined 
jointly. Therefore, the linear combination of weighted zj’s is endogenous and correlated with 
the error term uit. Estimation by OLS leads to inconsistent results. Therefore, I use an 
instrumental variables approach: The weighted linear combination of the zj’s is regressed on 
Xi and on the same weighted linear combination of the Xj’s. The fitted values of this 
regression are used as instruments for the weighted linear combination of the zj’s. As shown 
by Kelejian and Prucha (1998) this approach also solves the second complication, namely 
spatial error dependence. It arises when omitted variables, which become automatically part 
of the error term, are correlated across countries. As a consequence, one might observe policy 
co-movements across countries that are due to the omitted variable but not to policy 
interactions. The use of panel data may also alleviate the problem of spatial error dependence 
provided that the influence of the omitted variables can be captured by the country fixed 
effect.   
 
 
5  Interactions of capital account policies across countries: empirical results 
 
Table 2 presents the results of bivariate regressions: The change in capital account openness is 
regressed on its weighted change in the rest of the world. Whereas the regression of column 
(1) contains all countries of our database, the other columns present results for subsamples 
that are formed according to countries’ income level and geographic location. The results 
show that for the full sample domestic capital account policy is driven by policies elsewhere. 
                                                 
10 This, however, does not mean that the influence of one country on another is estimated. The relative 
importance of a country is determined a priori by the definition of the weights.    18
If the rest of the world opens its capital account, the domestic economy also liberalises its 
capital account. The coefficient of roughly 0.4 implies that on average countries liberalise 
their capital account to a lower degree than the rest of the world.
11 Policy spillovers are 
present, but countries do not outdo each other. There is no race to the bottom. This finding is 
consistent with the prediction of the theoretical model in section 3. The regression results for 
the subsamples show that this behaviour is mainly driven by the Latin American countries. 
For the other country groups, the policy in the rest of the world does not significantly 
influence domestic policies. 
 
[Insert Tables 2 and 3 about here] 
 
Table 3 replicates these regressions for a different measure of capital account openness, 
namely the index constructed by Edwards. The results support our hypothesis of interactions 
among countries: The sample of all countries and the subsamples of Latin American and 
Asian countries in particular are characterised by capital account policies that are triggered by 
policy changes in the rest of the world.  
 
The following tables include the standard set of control variables for capital account policy. 
They test whether policy spillovers can be identified in addition to the effects of fundamentals 
and exogenous shocks. The change in the Chinn-Ito index of capital account openness is used 
as dependent variable. 
Column (1) of Table 4 includes the set of macroeconomic control variables. An increase in 
economic development measured by changes in real GDP per capita reduces capital account 
openness. This finding, which is not in line with the theoretical predictions, is not robust to 
alternative specifications (see columns 3 and 4). A fixed exchange rate is associated with 
more restrictions on capital flows. This effect is consistent with the hypothesis of the policy 
trilemma. Capital account policy elsewhere triggers domestic policy changes: If the rest of the 
world liberalises capital flows, the domestic economy follows this trend. Coefficients for the 
                                                 
11 From a theoretical standpoint it is not plausible that each individual country liberalises less than the rest of the 
world. However, one has to bear in mind that this coefficient only measures the policy spillovers across 
countries, that is to say, policy changes that can neither be explained by domestic fundamentals nor common 
exogenous shocks. Common exogenous shocks (i.e. changes in world interest rates) or country linkages (i.e. in 
trade openness: an increase in one country necessarily leads to an increase in at least one other country) might be 
additional factors that lead to co-movements in capital account policies.   19
other economic variables are not statistically significant in the determination of capital 
account policy. 
Column (2) adds two political factors: Whereas a trend towards a more democratic regime is 
accompanied by a removal of capital account restrictions, the effect of changes in an index of 
economic and political freedom is not statistically significant. The existence of policy 
spillovers is robust to this change: A global liberalization of the capital account induces the 
domestic economy to open its capital account, too.  
Potential capital inflows might depend on world interest rates. Therefore, column 3 
additionally includes changes in US real interest rates as a covariate. A decrease in real 
returns on the world market is accompanied by a removal of capital controls. Decontrol might 
be politically feasible in an environment of low world interest rates since the risk of massive 
capital outflows is lower. Changes in the world interest rate lead to a co-movement of capital 
account policies in all countries since these changes are exogenous to domestic policy 
making. Nevertheless, our measure of policy spillovers is still significant. This implies that 
there are two sources of country co-movements: (i) global shocks affecting all countries and 
(ii) policy interdependencies due to economic competition and signalling externalities.   
Additionally, trade openness becomes significant in this specification. An opening of the 
current account is associated with an opening of the capital account. This co-movement might 
be the result of a package of liberal reforms.  
The last column in Table 4 adds changes in the exchange market pressure index. While 
currency crises do not significantly affect capital account policies, the effects of the other 
variables are qualitatively unchanged compared to column 3. 
 
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
 
The full sample consists of a heterogeneous set of countries. Policy making, however, might 
differ between more homogeneous groups of countries. Therefore, I divide the whole sample 
in two subsamples. 
The results are reported in Table 5. Columns (1) and (2) replicate the regressions of Table 4, 
columns (2) and (4) for a subsample of 22 industrial countries. While the explanatory power 
of the specifications is low and the majority of control variables is statistically insignificant, 
the presence of policy spillovers can be confirmed in one out of the two specifications.  
Columns (3) and (4) present the respective results for emerging and developing countries. The 
move to a fixed exchange rate regime and an increase in world interest rates turn out to be the   20
most important determinants of capital account policy. Both are associated with an imposition 
of capital controls. Our measure of policy interdependencies is significant in both 
specifications. In sum, contagion in capital account policies seems to be a characteristic of 
emerging and developing countries whereas the results indicate that co-movements in 
industrial countries are rather due to common shocks. 
  
[Insert Table 5 about here] 
 
6  Conclusions 
 
This paper reconsiders the determinants of countries’ capital account policy. Besides the 
standard control variables considered in the literature in this area, it focuses on capital account 
policies in the rest of the world.  
The theoretical section develops a model of policy choice in which countries interact 
strategically. It shows that a country’s best response to other countries’ policies consists in 
imitating their decisions: open the capital account when others remove capital controls and 
close the capital account when other countries impose restrictions.  
The empirical part tests this hypothesis. It investigates whether the policy in one country is 
correlated with the policy in other countries after controlling for economic and political 
fundamentals. The evidence is striking: The regression analysis suggests that capital account 
policies in neighbouring countries affect domestic policies by an economically and 
statistically significant degree. Countries imitate each other. 
With respect to the control variables, two effects are robust to different specifications: The 
adoption of a fixed exchange rate regime is accompanied by the imposition of capital controls. 
On average, countries are aware of the restrictions implied by the policy trilemma and set 
policies accordingly: They secure the move to a more rigid exchange rate regime by a 
reduction in capital mobility in order to maintain monetary policy independence. Restrictions 
on the capital account are strengthened when the real world interest rate increases.  
The results are consistent with the hypothesis that capital account policies are shaped by the 
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This graph depicts the best response of the domestic country to policy choices in the foreign country z(z*) and 
the best response of the foreign country to domestic policies z*(z). Point A is the non-cooperative Nash-








Table 1: Panel unit root tests 
 
Variable Lags  Trend 
Pesaran test (p-value) 
       Level        First-difference
Breitung test (p-value) 
      Level         First-difference
          
0  no  0.00 0.00 0.99 0.00  Capital account 
openness  0  yes  0.82 0.00 0.97 0.00 
  1  no  0.18 0.00 0.33 0.00 
  1  yes  1.00 0.00 0.24 0.00 
Real GDP per capita  0  no  1.00  0.00  1.00  0.00 
  0  yes  1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 
  1  no  0.99 0.00 1.00 0.00 
  1  yes  0.82 0.00 1.00 0.00 
Trade  openness  0  no  0.01 0.00 0.12 0.00 
  0  yes  0.10 0.00 0.08 0.00 
  1  no  0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 















  0  yes  0.84 0.00 0.03 0.00 
  1  no  0.08 0.00 0.00 0.00 
  1  yes  0.78 0.00 0.00 0.00 
0  no  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
0  yes  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Current account 
balance (relative to 
GDP) 
1  no  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
  1  yes  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Democracy  0  no  1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 
  0  yes  1.00 0.00 0.40 0.00 
  1  no  1.00 0.00 0.99 0.00 
 1  yes  1.00  0.00  0.00 
 
0.00 
Freedom  0  no  0.80 0.00 1.00 0.00 
  0  yes  1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
  1  no  1.00 0.00 0.99 0.00 
 1  yes  1.00 
 
0.00 0.00 0.00 
Currency crisis, index  0  no  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
  0  yes  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
  1  no  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 




Note:   This table reports the results of two panel unit root tests, namely those proposed by Pesaran (2007) and 
Breitung (2000). The p-value shows the level of significance at which the null hypothesis of a unit root 
in each individual time-series can be rejected. The alternative hypothesis is that all individual series are 
stationary. 
Both tests require a balanced panel data set. Therefore, for each variable a subsample is constructed that 
contains only those countries, for which data for the period 1975-2006 are available without gap. Since 
any systematic relationship between the availability of data and the characteristics of the time-series is 
improbable, the subsample can be considered as a random sample of the population of all countries. 
The results are sensitive to the number of lags included and to the choice of specification (trend). The 
inclusion of lags of the variable accounts for serial correlation in the errors. Therefore, results for 
different numbers of lags - with and without trend - are reported.  
As proposed by Levin, Lin and Chu (2002), before computing the Breitung test statistic the series are 
demeaned in order to mitigate the impact of cross-sectional correlation. 
The two variables for exchange rate regimes are not considered since they are dummy variables. 
Since the world interest rate is the same for all countries, its characteristics can be analysed by unit root 
tests for individual time-series. According to the Phillips-Perron test and the augmented Dickey-Fuller 
test the hypothesis of a unit root cannot be rejected at the 10% level of significance. After first-
differencing, however, the p-value falls to 0.00. 
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Table 2: Spatial interactions in capital account policies: Bivariate regressions 
Dependent variable: Change in openness of the capital account (Chinn-Ito-index) 
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t-statistics (in brackets) computed with heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors. 






Table 3: Spatial interactions in capital account policy 
Dependent variable: Change in openness of the capital account (Index of Edwards) 


























































































t-statistics (in brackets) computed with heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors. 
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Table 4: Determinants of capital account policy 
Dependent variable: Change in openness of the capital account (Chinn-Ito index) 
Estimation method:  Fixed effects estimator (all variables in first differences) 
 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
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Currency crisis, index 





















































t-statistics (in brackets) computed with heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors. 
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Table 5: Determinants of capital account policy: Subsamples 
Dependent variable: Change in openness of the capital account (Chinn-Ito index) 
Estimation method:  Fixed effects estimator (all variables in first differences) 
 
  Industrial countries  Emerging and developing countries 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
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t-statistics (in brackets) computed with heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors. 
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Appendix A: Capital account policy and the allocation of capital 
 
Assume that two countries produce a private good using mobile capital (K) and immobile 
labour (L) via a constant returns to scale production function 
 
) , ( L K F A Y ⋅ =    with  0 F     , 0 F    , 0 F     0, F LL KK L K < < > >  
 
where Y denotes output and A measures total factor productivity. In the intensive form this 
can be written as 
 
) (k f A y ⋅ =  
 
where y denotes output per capita and k represents capital per capita. The two countries 
produce according to the same production function but may differ in their capital account 
openness. International capital flows to the use with the highest risk-adjusted return. It thereby 
equalises net-of-tax returns such that in equilibrium its distribution satisfies: 
 
∗ ∗ ⋅ ⋅ = = ⋅ ⋅ z k f A r z k f A ) ( ' ) ( ' 
 
where z and z* are the indices of capital account openness ( 1 0 < < z ). The larger z, the more 
open the capital account. r is the endogenous worldwide net return. If the domestic country 
removes capital controls, its net return rises. As a consequence, capital leaves the foreign 
country and is re-invested in the domestic country. This has two consequences: First, capital 
per worker rises in the domestic economy. This temporarily increases the growth rate of 
output during the inflow period and leads to a permanently higher level of output. The 
country’s net return falls again until it reaches r. Second, r increases. The new equilibrium is 
characterised by a larger share of world capital invested in the domestic economy and by a 
higher net return of capital. 
 
Focusing on risk-adjusted returns, up to now the analysis implicitly assumed that the risk 
premium is not affected by a country’s capital account policy. As shown in Henry (2003, 
2007) for the case of the opening of the capital account in a previously closed economy, the 
change in the risk premium can be captured by the difference between the covariance of the 
return on the domestic and the world market on the one hand and the variance of the return on   27
the domestic market on the other. Empirical evidence reported in Stulz (1999) suggests that 
this difference is negative such that capital account liberalization reduces the risk premium.  
 
In sum, a removal of capital controls might provide a double dividend: First, it rises a 
country’s risk free rate of return for foreign investors. Second, it might reduce a country’s risk 























































































































































Notes:   This appendix lists the maximum number of countries that are used in our regression analysis. 
Countries marked with an asterisk belong to the group of emerging-market countries. 
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Appendix C: List of variables and data sources 
 
Variable Source  Description 
 






























































































Measure of the de jure openness of the capital 
account. Calculation is based on the binary 
dummy variables of the IMF’s Annual Report on 
Exchange Arrangements and Exchange 
Restrictions (AREAER).  
 
Index that combines the measures from Quinn 
(2003) and Mody and Murshid (2005) [both are 
based on the information provided by the 
AREAER] and information from country-
specific sources. 
 
Weighted sum of the Chinn-Ito index of capital 
account openness over all countries excluding 
the country under consideration, where the 
weights decrease in geographic distance and sum 
up to one. 
 
 
GDP is measured as gross domestic product in 
constant international dollars with the year 2000 
as base. An international dollar has the same 
purchasing power over GDP as the U.S. dollar 
has in the United States. This measure of GDP is 
divided by the population, which counts all 
residents regardless of legal status or citizenship.
 
Openness is defined as the sum of exports and 
imports divided by GDP. Data are expressed in 
per cent. 
 
Government size is defined as general  
government final consumption expenditure, 
which includes all government current 
expenditure for purchases of goods and services, 
relative to current GDP. 
 
Current account balance is the sum of net 
exports of goods and services, net income and 
net current transfers. Data are divided by GDP. 
 
Equals one if one of the following finer 
categories applies: dollarized, currency board, 
monetary union, single currency peg, published 
basket peg and secret basket peg. 
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Appendix C (continued) 
 
































































Equals one if one of the following finer 
categories applies: cooperative system, crawling 
peg, target zone, unclassified rule-based 
intervention, managed float with heavy 
intervention, unclassified managed float and 
other floats.  
 
World interest rates are proxied by the U.S. real 
interest rate. This is defined as the lending 
interest rate adjusted for inflation as measured 
by the GDP deflator. 
 
Democracy is measured by a score, which 
combines the information of indicators of 
democracy and autocracy (POLITY2 variable). 
It ranges from +10 (strongly democratic) to -10 
(strongly autocratic). 
 
Index of political rights from the Freedom in the 
World survey. It measures the freedom of the 
electoral process, political pluralism and 
participation and the functioning of the 
government. The numerical ratings lie between 1 
and 7, with 1 representing the most free and 7 
the least free case. 
 
The identification of a currency crisis is based on 
an exchange market pressure index. The 
calculation follows the procedure as described in 
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